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Paris conference essay   10/2/14 
Fifteen Years of Supreme Court Criminal Procedure Work: Three Constitutional Brushes 
 
By Daniel Richman∗  
 
Perhaps my association of Paris with artists has provoked the metaphors in this 
conference essay.  But I don’t think so, for it’s hard (for me at least) to teach recent US 
constitutional cases in the crime and security area without thinking in brush stoke terms.  
How else can one pull together a quarter-century of cases in which the US Supreme 
Court’s constitutional interventions have taken the form, on one hand, of thin and clear 
doctrinal lines on miniature doctrinal canvases that have only passing connections to 
criminal justice realities, and on the other, of vague promises of judicial interest that 
leave most of the hard work of norm articulation to other institutions? It would be 
convenient to find a unifying theme across the Court’s deployment of such diverse styles 
in some notion of judicial competence or capacity to effect change. But, as will be seen, 
the Court’s articulated ambitions have regularly exceeded its achievements. Alternatively 
one can suggest that the Court has in each case picked a brush it thought appropriate, and 
sometimes misjudged its work’s usefulness. But that is too tautological to be useful. 
 
Lacking a grand explanatory theory, I will focus instead on identifying three 
different styles and invite readers to join me in figuring out the reasons for their use and 
their fitness for purpose. One elaborately articulates doctrine but, either by design or 
effect, occupies a small field. A second takes on a far larger regulatory subject but takes 
extreme care to limit the scope of its intervention. A third hints at sweeping structural 
ambitions reminiscent of the Warren Court’s Criminal Procedure Revolution, but ends 
ups relying heavily on or collaborating with other regulatory authorities. 
 
Readers undoubtedly can come up with more than three styles. But, in any event, 
the exercise highlights the limited nature of the Court’s work during this period, as well 
as the limits of formalism in the area.  It also quietly suggests the need for scholars to 
disaggregate broad references to “constitutionalism.”  
 
I.  Current Constitutional Ambitions and Past Constitutional History 
 
Listening to conversations about crime and domestic security issues in policy 
circles and the public square might easily lead one to believe that constitutional law – real 
or aspirational – is the most fit and available source of guidance. For better or worse – 
and I think for worse  -- rights conversations have a privileged status in debates about 
government programs, regardless of whether they merely implicate or actually violate 
established constitutional norms. Yet when it comes to the actual constitutional output of 
the Supreme Court, the world looks very different. Indeed, as I will show here, the 
Court’s most conspicuous and sustained criminal rights projects have amounted to highly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗ Paul J. Kellner Professor, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Bernard Harcourt for organizing the 
conference, to the French National Research Agency for funding it, to participants for very useful 
responses, and to Rebecca Brown, Michael Graetz, Jamal Greene, and David Sklansky for enormously 
helpful comments on previous drafts. 
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developed but extraordinarily thin judicial interventions into messy and previously 
avoided aspects of adjudication process. 
 
 First, a baseline point: One must take care when comparing the Court’s limited 
constitutional forays to the large-scale regulatory projects the Court pursued during the 
Criminal Procedure Revolution of yore. In the sprawling, largely county-based, American 
criminal justice system, no constitutional intervention will be truly transformative. Not 
only has the Supreme Court – and state constitutional courts – historically taken care not 
to radically outpace the political branches, but local experimentation and political 
dynamics will inevitably put some jurisdictions ahead of doctrinal change.  
 
Consider the Warren Court’s much heralded creation of the right to counsel for all 
indigent defendants in felony cases,1 and then the Burger Court’s extension of that right 
to any misdemeanor prosecution that results in jail time.2 Where a state had not 
previously provided counsel, these were indeed dramatic and consequential decisions. In 
those states that already provided counsel, not so much. Still, although few would claim 
that Gideon’s promise has been achieved, no one doubts its transformative effect, even 
where it has been limited to a constant war between constitutional doctrine and 
competing resource demands. 
 
Or consider Miranda – which barred the use against a defendant of statements he 
made during a custodial interrogation unless he had been informed of his right to silence 
and to consult with an attorney -- another signature Warren Court constitutional decision. 
Here, too, an important institutional actor – in this case, the FBI – had anticipated the 
Court’s move and shown its manageability.3 And police officers have come to live 
comfortably with Miranda, profiting from its clarity and sometimes circumventing its 
strictures.4 Yet we can still see the decision as a large-scale intervention into stationhouse 
practices, and it’s still criticized for doing just that.5  Indeed, there are reasons why broad 
constitutional rulings should be the norm in the area. As Donald Dripps has noted, “the 
institutional context of criminal procedure doctrine – characterized by a high volume of 
cases, costly retrials as the dominant remedy, and legislative neglect” argues strongly for 
rule-like opinions that tell police and lower courts what the law is.6   
 
 It’s hardly interesting that the Court’s recent criminal procedure forays fall short 
of some imagined or real Warren Court baseline.  Of course they don’t, and no one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S 335 (1963).	  
2 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 508 (1966) (noting that the FBI practice “can readily be emulated by 
state and local enforcement agencies”); Bernard Schwartz, Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme 
Court, 589 (1983) (exploring role that FBI practice played during the Justices’ deliberations in Miranda). 
4 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 L. & 
Soc. Rev. 259 (1996); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 154 (1998) 
(discussing questioning “outside Miranda”). 
5 See Paul Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's 
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1061 (1998).  
6 Donald Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing 
Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 40 (2001). 
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expects otherwise. Worth exploring, and my subject here, are the different ways in which 
the Court has fallen short. Leading scholars, most notably Cass Sunstein,7 have written 
about the Rehnquist Court’s “minimalism,” its case-by-case navigation of difficult 
terrain. But Court (both under Rehnquist and more recently) has not always navigated 
with care, and even when it does, there are different styles of navigation (or, to keep with 
my metaphor, of painting). In two conspicuous and sustained lines of cases, the Court’s 
misty-eyed invocations of grand constitutional principles may lead one to miss the 
minimal effects of the elaborate doctrinal refinement on actual criminal processes.  The 
result has the elaborate miniatures that I will discuss first. Then, I’ll turn to a second 
style, where while potentially addressing a far larger range of cases – the ones that never 
go to trial -- the Court has proceeded gingerly, adding a few doctrinal lines but eschewing 
significant interference in the “bargaining” process. Finally, I’ll consider what may be the 
Court’s most consequential regulatory forays, which amount to hazy promises of greater 
judicial interest, in hopes that other institutions have or will add doctrinal nuance and 
clarity. 
 
II.  Elaborate Miniatures 
 
Even as the Court has endeavored to deconstitutionalize certain aspects of police 
practice,8 it has embarked on two elaborate rights-articulation projects in the adjudication 
area -- the constitutionalization of sentencing procedure in the Apprendi/Blakely/Booker 
line of cases, and the reconfiguration of the Confrontation Clause right in Crawford and 
its progeny. Regularly returning to add (sometime inconsistent) lines, the Court sought to 
impose a new constitutional order on matters that had hitherto been left largely to 
jurisdictional (state or federal) choice.   
 
A.  Apprendi/Blakely and the Constitutionalization of Sentencing Procedure 
 
Until the 1980s, constitutional regulation of sentencing procedures was 
extraordinarily minimalist by any measure. The Supreme Court’s abstention (at least 
originally) purported to reflect a deep respect for the wide discretion that every 
jurisdiction had allowed sentencing judges and for the importance of highly 
individualized sentencing determinations. Thus in Williams v. New York,9 where a state 
judge had rejected a jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment for a defendant 
convicted of first degree murder and had instead sentenced him to death on the basis of 
additional information not given to the jury but presented to the judge by the probation 
department, the Court found no violation of the defendant’s due process rights.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism, 43 Tulsa L. Rev. 825 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case 
at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (2001); see also Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search 
of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951 (2005). 
8See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (restriction of exclusionary rule to exclude merely 
negligent violations, see fit it); Anthony O’Rourke, Structural Overdelegation in Criminal Procedure, 103 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 407, 408-08 (2013) (noting Court’s recent tendency to delegate discretionary 
authority to enforcement officials).   
9 337 U.S. 241 (1949).	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 Even as the Court (later) developed an elaborate capital punishment 
jurisprudence,10 its reliance on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and 
unusual punishments” to regulate the death penalty allowed it to leave the procedures 
governing all other criminal sanctions virtually unregulated. This abstention was – at 
least initially – done in the name of enlightened jurisprudence. The New York statute in 
Williams, Justice Black noted, reflected “a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that 
the punishment should fit the offenders, and not merely the crime.”11 And that same 
modern approach counseled leaving sentencing judges unrestrained in the information 
they considered and the weight they gave it as they assessed a defendant’s capacity for 
reformation and rehabilitation. 
 
Over time, and to various degrees in various jurisdictions, sentencing reformers 
worried about undue disparities, arbitrariness, and racial discrimination combined with 
critics worried about undue judicial leniency to implement a variety of measures to 
restrain or eliminate judges’ freedom to pick a sentence within very large statutory 
ranges.12 By the late 1980s, the clear trend across federal and state jurisdictions was to 
use some combination of guidelines and mandatory minimums to regulate sentencing and 
to reduce judicial sentencing discretion. Case facts – at least those presented to the judge 
by the prosecutor or defense counsel at sentencing, whether after trial or after a guilty 
plea – would now have much clearer sentencing consequences. A narcotics offense 
involving a particular amount of drugs would now require a sentence within some 
specified range; the use of a firearm in connection with the offense would lead to an 
additional amount of time, and so on. Sentencing would now be more driven by “law,” 
through a regulatory regime that allowed both prosecution and defense to get appellate 
relief when a sentencing judge had failed to comply. 
 
Even as the statutory consequences of sentencing-related factfinding became 
clearer (and often more punitive), the constitutional regime governing that process 
initially remained as it had been in the old discretionary days. In 1986, for instance, 
where a defendant complained about a Pennsylvania sentencing scheme that required a 
judge to impose a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonments if she found by a 
preponderance of evidence that the defendant had “visibly possessed a firearm” during 
the commission of his offense, the Supreme Court found no cause for concern.13 Visible 
possession, the Court found, was not an “element” of the offense – i.e. the sort of fact that 
had to be found by a jury (according to the Sixth Amendment) “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” (according to the due process clause).14 Rather, it was a mere “sentencing factor,” 
and the state legislature had simply “dictated the precise weight” that judges should give 
one fact when setting the sentence within the broad statutory range. Indeed, given 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See, e.g., Carol Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker. "Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate," 
100 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 643 (2010); Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker. "Sober Second 
Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment," 109 Harvard 
Law Review 355 (1995). 
11 337 U.S. at 247. 
12 See Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998). 	  
13 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986).   
14 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt “of every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [deft] is charged”).   
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growing concerns about the traditionally broad discretion allowed to judges, one could, 
(then) Justice Rehnquist noted, hardly quarrel with a legislative decision to reduce the 
scope of judicial discretion.  
 
In 2000, however, the Court started to subject sentencing procedures to a more 
rigorous constitutional analysis. Confronted with a New Jersey regime that set a range of 
5-10 years’ imprisonment for possession of firearm for unlawful purpose but provided for 
an “extended term” of 10-20 years if a judge found, by a “preponderance” that the crime 
had been committed with the purpose to “intimidate” an individual or group because of 
“race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity,” the Court held 
that it violated the due process clause. A “factual determination authorizing an increase in 
the maximum prison sentence” had to, Justice Stevens (a dissenter in the 1986 
Pennsylvania case) explained, be “made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”15   
 
The Court took care to harmonize its new scrutiny of sentencing procedures that 
increased statutory maximums with its cases – like that from 1986 – allowing statutes that 
required the imposition of minimum sentences based on judicial factfinding.  The process 
attending the imposition of far more consequential mandatory minimum sentences could 
thus be a lot more casual (no jury; no “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard) than the 
process that increased the possible maximum.16 Yet the Court continued to push forward, 
taking its biggest step in 2004, in Blakely v. Washington.17 There, the Court – this time 
with Justice Scalia writing the majority, joined by Stevens, among others – looked 
beyond the formal statutory maximums of the offenses the defendant had plead to and 
focused on the way the Washington guidelines regime had conditioned the imposition on 
an enhanced sentence (for kidnapping and domestic violence offenses) on a finding of 
“deliberate cruelty.” Because the judge (and not a jury) had made just such finding 
(without any concession in that regard by the defendant), and had done so on the basis of 
a lower proof standard than that required at trial, his imposition of a sentence three years 
above the “standard range” allowed by the Washington guidelines, had violated 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 
 
 The change wrought by Blakely and a number of cases that followed in quick 
succession – involving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,18 California’s sentencing 
scheme,19 among other regimes – had its limits. A jurisdiction willing to give its 
sentencing judges broad discretion, without mandating that any specific sentencing 
consequence follow from the finding of pre-specified facts, was free to do so, without any 
need for jury findings on those facts a judge deemed significant or for higher proof 
burdens. But if a legislature opted for a regime in which specified facts had mandatory 
sentencing consequences (i.e. the prosecution could take an appeal from the judge who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
16 See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (reaffiming McMillian), overruled, Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
17 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).	  
18 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
19 Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007)  
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found the facts but refused to increase a sentence on that basis), those facts would have to 
be either found by a jury or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea. The jury 
would thus, Scalia explained in Blakely, serve as a “circuit breaker” – the entity that 
would ensure that government doesn’t misuse the criminal justice system to overpunish a 
defendant. In an era when legislatures were prone to curtail broad judicial sentencing 
discretion, the Court’s new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence seemed to herald a 
sentencing revolution – to the chagrin of Justice Breyer, a key drafter of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines.20 
 
 The formalist mechanism set in motion in 2000 ground on through 2013, when 
the Court, in Alleyne v. United States, overruled prior precedent and finally held that the 
facts triggering mandatory minimums would also have to be found by a jury or admitted 
by the defendant at his plea.21 Writing for a majority that did not include Justice Scalia, 
Justice Thomas explained that “[d]efining facts that increase a mandatory statutory 
minimum to be part of the substantive offense,” requiring that they be found by a jury, 
“preserves the historic role of the jury as an intermediary between the State and criminal 
defendants.”22 
 
There may be a few more occasions for the Court’s intervention as the 
ramifications of the 2013 decision get sorted out.23 Yet the fractured nature of the Alleyne 
Court suggests that this line of cases has run its course. So does the Court’s readiness, in 
Oregon v. Ice (2009),24 to let judges, not juries, decide the facts on which turn perhaps 
the most consequential issue in a sentencing – whether the sentences imposed on a 
defendant convicted of multiple offenses run concurrently or consecutively. Writing for 
the Court – against a bitter dissent by Justice Scalia – Justice Ginsberg reasoned that this 
sort of fact finding was just the sort of thing judges had always done, and she dismissed 
the argument that a jury had to decide such a consequential matter as unduly formalistic.  
She explained:  
 
All agree that a scheme making consecutive sentences the rule, and concurrent 
sentences the exception, encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal. To hem in States 
by holding that they may not equally choose to make concurrent sentences the 
rule, and consecutive sentences the exception, would make scant sense. Neither 
Apprendi nor our Sixth Amendment traditions compel straitjacketing the States in 
that manner.25 
 
With a majority of the Court joining Justice Ginsburg to defend state sentencing 
experimentation, it is doubtful that this 15-year-old constitutional intervention will extend 
much further. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Blakely v. Washington, 296, 328 (2004) (Breyer, J. dissenting) 
21 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
22 Id. at 2161. 
23 See Nancy J. King & Bryann E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground: Factfinding that Limits Eligibility 
for Probation or Parole Release, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rptr. 287 (2014); see also United States v. Wilkes, 744 
F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that Apprendi does not apply to criminal forfeiture). 
24 Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009)	  
25 Id. at 171. 
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 So what was accomplished? As Frank Bowman – a leading American sentencing 
procedure scholar -- has noted: 
 
[A] line of cases supposedly rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause 
might be deemed a success if it had achieved Justice Scalia’s stated objective of 
reasserting the centrality of the jury to determination of facts essential to the 
determination of criminal punishments.  But it has done nothing of the kind.   
 
So far as can be determined, the advent of the Blakely-Booker sentencing 
era has neither increased the number of criminal jury trials nor materially 
expanded the number of sentence-affecting facts decided by juries in those trials 
that do occur.26 
 
 The irony of the Court’s celebration of juries and its deployment of them to 
regulate sentencing is that this a regime with very few trials. Jurisdictions vary in the 
degree to which they are dominated by guilty plea dispositions.  (The term “plea 
bargaining” is generally used, but in a country as punitive as the United States, these are 
rarely “bargains.”). The general rule, however, is that more than 90% of all criminal 
convictions arise out of guilty pleas, not trials.27 
 
If Blakely-Booker did not increase jury trials, perhaps it slightly increased a 
defendant’s bargaining position with prosecutors. If the only way a particular sentencing 
enhancement could be imposed -- absent a jury (or bench) trial -- could be upon a 
defendant’s admission to the facts supporting that enhancement, the defendant might 
exchange that admission for some sentencing concession from the prosecution, i.e. 
dispensing with a yet higher enhancement, or forgoing additional charges. Still, even if 
the new jury rights had this effect – and it far from clear that they did -- their marginal 
contribution to defendant bargaining power renders the Court’s grand rhetoric about the 
jury’s role superfluous. And it makes the Court’s intervention into the process by which 
legislatures regulate the sentencing discretion exercised by trial judges a lot harder to 
justify. 
 
 So what did the Court think it was accomplishing? Mind reading is hard, but it is 
entirely possible that this entire constitutional project was triggered by the Court’s out-
sized interest in federal sentencing. (Outsized because fewer than 5% of U.S. felony 
prosecutions occur in federal courts.28)  Even though Blakely involved Washington State 
sentencing, the Federal Guidelines – the subject of sustained criticism by lower court 
federal judges and the vehicle for increased congressional intervention in federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing Law and 
How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 461 (2010). 
27 In Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012), the Court drew on Justice Department statistics to 
report that “[n]inety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are 
the result of guilty pleas.” 
28 See Daniel Richman, Kate Stith & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes 2 (2014) (giving 
comparative statistics). 
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sentences – were front and center.29 The Court’s discovery of the Sixth Amendment’s 
relevance to sentencing may primarily have been intended as both a rebuke to Congress 
and a magical solution to the legislative log-jam preventing sentencing reform.30 In this 
account, the impact on state systems may just be collateral damage from a clash between 
the federal political branches – with Congress and the Executive in close alliance – and 
the judicial branch.   
 
 It is too early to assess the impact this Sixth Amendment foray has had on 
sentencing across US jurisdictions.  Debate continues even as to whether it has much of 
an effect within the federal system. But if the Court’s intervention is taken on its own, 
jury-focused terms, its intensity and duration have been radically out of proportion to its 
systemic effects. 
  
B.   Crawford and the New Confrontation Clause 
 
 Even as 2004 saw the Court, in Blakely, extend constitutional regulation of 
sentencing procedure beyond formal statutory maximums to effective guideline 
maximums, so too did it see another dramatic Sixth Amendment intervention – this one 
affecting the prosecution’s evidence in criminal trials. Here too, Justice Scalia’s 
originalist conception of that provision anchored the Court’s work.31 And here too have 
criminal justice realities and variable support from his colleagues started to make it into 
another constitutional miniature. 
 
Before 2004, Confrontation Clause doctrine was powered by an easy pragmatism. 
Criminal defendants had a right to confront – to see and cross-examine – the witnesses 
called by the prosecution to prove its case against them. The Court recognized, however, 
that the ability to confront an in-court witness was of limited value if she simply relayed 
the statements of an out-of-court declarant, with the prosecution relying on the truth of 
those statements (i.e. introducing hearsay). It therefore read the Clause to reflect a 
“preference” for face-to-face confrontation at trial whenever an absent declarant’s 
statements were offered for their truth.32  If the declarant was unavailable or if her 
statement had some independent evidentiary value,33 however, the hearsay could be 
introduced without violating the Clause so long as it either fell within a “firmly rooted 
hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”34 After all, 
both the Clause and hearsay doctrine, with its manifold exceptions, were designed to 
protect the same goal of reliability. And luckily for prosecutors, law students, and fans of 
simplistic doctrinal analysis, it turned out that pretty much all of the hearsay exceptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale 
L.J. 1420 (2008).  
30 See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds – The Center Doesn’t, 117 
Yale L.J. 1374 (2008). 
31 See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, 
the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants, 94 Geo. L.J 183 (2005). 
32 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980). 
33 See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
34 Crawford v. Washington, 448 U.S. at 66. 
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under federal and state law were “firmly rooted,” and that state and federal lower court 
scrutiny of reliability was often lackadaisical.35 
 
In 2004, Crawford completely changed this constitutional landscape. The 
Confrontation Clause, Justice Scalia now explained, had been designed to prevent in-
court use of ex parte out-of-court witness examinations (of the sort conducted by 
Sixteenth Century magistrates in England). “An accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark 
to an acquaintance does not.” To the extent a statement was obtained under analogous 
circumstances, it could not be offered for its truth in the absence of the declarant unless 
he was unavailable and had previous been cross-examined or when the framers had 
required otherwise. “Leaving the regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of 
evidence,” Scalia noted “would render the Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent 
even the most flagrant inquisitorial practices.”36 
 
 Scalia’s approach shifted the doctrinal focus away from the reliability of the out-
of-court statements: “To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of 
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.”37 This move made Confrontation Clause protection 
far more robust, to the extent the Clause applied. Statements deemed “testimonial” could 
no longer be introduced just because a judge had deemed them “reliable.” But the 
negative implication of Crawford was that the Confrontation Clause had nothing to say 
about the introduction of non-testimonial statements. Prior doctrine purported to put all 
prosecutorial uses of out-of-court statements for their truth under constitutional scrutiny 
for “reliability” whenever the declarant did not testify at trial. Now, as a 2006 decision 
soon made clear,38 only “testimonial” statements would be the subject of a Confrontation 
Clause inquiry, and non-testimonial statements (no matter how dubious their reliability) 
would be beyond the clause’s purview. Thus, a nice framed canvas, leaving out most 
hearsay statements. 
 
Yet what present-day circumstances amounted to the ex parte examinations 
conducted by English Justices of the Peace under a statute from Queen Mary’s reign? In 
its embrace of originalism as a constraint on judicial discretion, the Crawford Court 
offered some easy examples – grand jury testimony, guilty plea allocutions, and formal 
police interrogations – but, in this first pass at the new canvas, left lower court scant 
guidance for sorting through the various statements that unavailable witnesses had made 
to the police or other official actors in less formal settings. In time, the Court added new 
brush strokes, and in 2006, with Justice Scalia writing again, it held that statements in 
response to questioning by police officers, emergency operators or other law enforcement 
personnel are “testimonial” only when “circumstances objectively indicate . . . that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Bibas, supra note __, at 189-90; David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 
39-40. 
36 Crawford, 448 U.S. at __  
37 Crawford, 448 U.S. at __.	  
38 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824 (2006).  
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primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution,” rather than to respond to “an ongoing 
emergency.”39 
 
To use Cass Sunstein’s terms,40 these initial decisions were “deep,” in the sense that 
they were robustly theorized, and were not particularly “narrow.” To be sure, only 
statements deemed “testimonial” would be implicated. But the undemanding nature of 
prior doctrine – which generally found the Confrontation Clause satisfied in any case 
where local evidentiary rules allowed the admission of a statement under some sort of 
hearsay analysis41 – had made statements to law enforcement officials the main 
constitutional battleground. Now, the Court seemed to promise, the terms of those battles 
would be radically different.42 
 
 Critical members of the Court, however, soon recoiled from the ramifications of 
the project and prepared the basis for limiting it. In 2008, Giles v. California43 presented 
a sadly recurring scenario: a domestic violence murder prosecution in which the victim 
had previously told the police of prior instances of domestic violence by the defendant. 
Contestably assuming that the victim’s statements were “testimonial,”44 Justice Scalia 
rejected the state’s argument that, by causing the victim’s unavailability (by murdering 
her), defendant had forfeited his constitutional right to confront her at trial with respect to 
those prior statements. Under common law both before the Founding and after, Scalia 
asserted, the defendant must be found to have specifically intended to prevent a declarant 
from testifying before he can be deemed to have forfeited his right to confront her.45 
 
 With the same trust in ordinary government processes and antipathy to formalism 
that pit him against Scalia in sentencing cases, Justice Breyer contested Scalia’s 
reasoning here and asked: 
 
What important constitutional interest is served [] where a prior testimonial 
statement of a victim of abuse is at issue, by a constitutional rule that lets that 
evidence in if the defendant killed a victim purposely to stop her from testifying, 
but keeps it out if the defendant killed her knowing she could no longer testify 
while acting out of anger or revenge?46 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Id. at 822. 
40 See Sunstein, supra note __; see Neil S. Siegel, supra note __ (using Blakely and Crawford as examples 
of non-minimalist decisions). 
41 See Robert P. Mosteller, Giles v. California: Avoiding Serious Damage to Crawford’s Limited 
Revolution, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 675, 679 (2009) (characterizing the protection provided by Ohio v. 
Roberts as “a mile wide and an inch deep”). 
42 See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 749 (2005) (noting that 
“within days – even hours – of the Crawford decision, prosecutors were dismissing or losing hundreds of 
domestic violence cases that would have presented little difficulty in the past”).	  
43 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
44 Id. at 377 (Alito, J., concurring) (questioning whether statement were “testimonial”). 
45 554 U.S. at 367. 
46 554 U.S at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens and Kennedy). 
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And two members of Scalia’s five-vote majority explained how, in the future, domestic 
violence prosecutors could circumvent his ostensibly demanding analysis by using an 
abusive relationship as a basis for presuming a specific intent to prevent the victim from 
testifying. This appears to be a path that prosecutors have since taken.47 
 
 The breadth and depth of Scalia’s Crawford project also brought it into conflict 
with the realities of forensic evidence. First came a relatively easy (at least in hindsight) 
case.  In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,48 the Court (with Scalia writing for the 
majority) held that the out-of-court statements of forensic scientists were to be treated 
like those of any other witness, and that the Confrontation Clause had been violated when 
the state had allowed a laboratory analyst’s sworn certification about seized drugs to 
substitute for the actual testimony of government chemists.49 Two years later, the Court, 
by 5 to 4, held that the state could not prove up the contents of blood alcohol report by 
calling an analyst who had neither conducted the tests nor prepared the report.50 Yet one 
of the five (Justice Sotomayor, who had replaced Souter), suggested that the analysis 
might be different had the absent analyst’s testimonial certification merely been relied on 
by the testifying expert as a basis for his own independent conclusion.51 This is quite a 
loophole, and one that, in 2012. Justice Alito and three colleagues were willing to drive a 
truck through in Williams v. Illinois – a case where a police lab analyst’s testimony relied 
explicitly and heavily on DNA reports submitted by a contract lab.52 This approach drew 
a sharp dissent from Justice Kagan – joined by Scalia, among others – who labeled “the 
idea that such ‘basis evidence’ comes in not for its truth, but only to help the factfinder 
evaluate an expert's opinion” “nonsense” and “sheer fiction.”53 That is where things now 
stand: with the court divided 4 to 4, with the missing vote being Justice Thomas -- who 
shares Kagan’s view of the inadequacy of Alito’s opinion, but whose extremely narrow 
definition of “testimonial” does not include lab reports like the ones in Williams that are 
“not the product of any sort of formalized dialogue resembling custodial interrogation.”54 
 
 The fractured state of the Williams Court seems (as of 2014) to have put the 
Crawford project on hiatus, at least with respect to forensic evidence. Presumably 
because it doesn’t feel capable of adding value (until a mind or the composition of the 
Court changes), the Court has retreated from this line of business, leaving the lower 
courts to grapple with important and recurring issues involving, among other things, 
reports of autopsies conduct by now-unavailable pathologists.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See Michael Vargas, Note, Prosecuting Domestic Violence After Giles: Why a Categorical Approach to 
the Forfeiture Doctrine Threatens Female Autonomy, 20 Duke J. Gender L. & Policy 137, 174 (2012). 
48 557 U.S. 305 (2009).	  
49 Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 
2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, __ (2013). 
50 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
51 Id. at 2721-23 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
52 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
53 Id. at 2269 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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 Meanwhile, even the core meaning of Crawford has been eroded. By 2011, in 
Michigan v. Bryant,55 the Court showed fatigue with or even regrets about the whole 
project.  Here, police officers, responding to a call about a shooting, found a gunshot 
victim. Upon being asked what had happened, the man described the shooter and 
thereafter died. Upholding the introduction of this statement at the subsequent trial of 
person identified, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, held that a decision 
about whether the statements were “testimonial” required consideration not just of the 
declarant’s motives but those of his interrogators, who faced the public safety emergency 
of a loose shooter. “Because the circumstances of the encounter as well as the statements 
and actions of [the victim] and the police objectively indicate that the ‘primary purpose of 
the interrogation’ was ‘to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,’” the 
statements were not testimonial.56 
 
The significance of Michigan v. Bryant doesn’t lie in its result. After all, a “dying 
declaration” analysis – had it been properly developed in the lower courts – might have 
avoided any inquiry into the statement’s “testimonial” nature. Nor does it lie simply lie in 
the Court’s move to a “combined inquiry” into motivation rather than a declarant-
centered one – even though that move itself provoked Justice Scalia’s ire.  Rather what 
led him – writing only for himself, as one of only dissenters -- to declare that “today's 
opinion distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles”57 
was Sotomayor’s readiness to collapse the new Crawford inquiry into the old malleable 
hearsay “reliability” inquiry and to barely conceal the change. 
 
It is too soon to tell if Bryant presages a return to status quo ante Crawford, 
though many have understandably read it just that way.58 But I suspect that it does mark 
the end of the Court’s interest in regulating the introduction at trial of arguably 
“testimonial” statements by non-testifying witnesses. Defendants will henceforth enjoy 
Confrontation Clause protection when statements were made in set-piece police 
interrogations, grand jury appearances, and analogous situations. Beyond these easy 
cases, I expect lower courts to make fact-sensitive calls and the Supreme Court to remain 
on the sidelines. 
 
Assuming this prediction is correct, one should not dismiss the Court’s sustained 
intervention as having achieved nothing. Although Scalia’s opinion in Crawford was 
grounded in originalism, it was, I suspect, the formalism of his analysis that got him a 
majority, for it seemed to promise an end to what Scalia fairly called a “malleable 
standard” that had often failed to protect defendants against “paradigmatic confrontation 
violations.”59 While Bryant substantially pruned the paradigm that Scalia had in mind and 
will spark a lot of “reliability” inquiries of the sort Scalia worried about, violations of 
Crawford’s core protection – against evidence obtained from what amount to ex parte 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). 	  
56 Id. at 1150 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
57 131 S Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58See Brooks Holland, Crawford and Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts After All?, 2 
Bklyn. J. L. & Policy, 517, 518 (2012) (““Bryant thus put the brakes on the Crawford train, and maybe 
even started its return to the Roberts station.”). 
59 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60.	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examinations of non-testifying witnesses – will remain a lot less likely in those 
courtrooms familiar with the Supreme Court’s work. Perhaps Justice Thomas, whose 
highly formal definition of “testimonial” left him writing many opinions for himself, had 
the right idea all along (at least if “right” is judged in predictive terms). 
 
At the same time, the thinness of even the right broadly announced in Crawford 
ought not be forgotten.  Once a statement is deemed to be “testimonial,” the prosecution 
generally cannot offer it without calling the declarant to the stand – assuming the 
defendant did not forfeit his confrontation right or have a prior opportunity to confront.  
Constitutionally mandated “confrontation,” however, does not require that, once 
testifying, the declarant have any memory of having made the prior declaration, or even 
of the underlying facts. At least such appears to be the current state of the law, even 
where (in a sadly recurring scenario) a child sex abuse victim -- having been interviewed 
before trial for prosecution purposes – takes the stand but remembers little or nothing 
about either the interview or the sex abuse recounted in it.60  Nor does the current 
constitutional understanding of “confrontation” give defense a general right to disclosure 
from the prosecution of materials that would promote effective confrontation. 
 
C.  Conclusion 
 
 The Apprendi and Crawford sagas certainly show what the Court’s sustained 
attention to constitutional criminal procedure projects can look like. Do they also show 
something about the limits – perceived or inherent – of such projects? When one starts 
with a multi-member judicial bloc with heterogeneous preferences and adds changes in 
Court composition, answering such basic questions is hard indeed. Had the Court been 
more united in its support for each project, perhaps its interventions might well have been 
more sustained in time and more conceptually robust. Yet each formalistic project had a 
self-limiting quality – as if the Court felt freest to lay down clear lines only when it 
painted on small canvases.   
 
III. Putting Up Posters in the Marketplace 
 
The stories of Crawford and Apprendi might lead one to cast the Court as an 
arcane bystander of the regular criminal process. How else can one think of an institution 
that deployed originalist doctrines grounded in an anachronistic celebration of trials and 
then quietly retreated in the face of the implementation challenges endemic in a 
sprawling criminal justice system where convictions usually come from guilty pleas, and 
where police officers at or near crime scenes are nothing like Marian magistrates. But the 
fine (albeit wavering) hand the Court used in those cases is not its only style. Indeed, in 
the long term, the Court’s more episodic constitutional forays into the relatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See State v. Cameron M., 307 Conn. 504, 520 n. 18 (2012) (collecting state cases); People v. Eagle, 2014 
WL 667654, Cal. App. 4 Dist. (2014).  For an outlier case finding, in wake of Crawford, that confrontation 
requires more than more the physical presence of a willing witness, see Goforth v. State, 70 So.3d 174 
(Miss. 2011). The last word from the Supreme Court on the issue came in United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 
554, 559 (1988) (finding confrontation right “not denied when a witness testifies as to his current belief but 
is unable to recollect the reason for that belief.”). 
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unregulated thicket of plea bargaining and defense advocacy may – even though they 
amount to a few posters in the marketplace (or few black lines against a grey background, 
if the brushstroke metaphor is working for you)--- be of more lasting significance.  And 
they seem both far removed from formalism and ungrounded in originalism. 
 
First, a quick overview of the constitutional underpinnings of the plea bargaining 
process that constitutes the real adjudication process for most criminal defendants.  In the 
1970s, the Court laid down the basic doctrinal pieces. A defendant’s entry of guilty plea 
is not inappropriately coerced merely because the prosecution has obtained it either by 
threatening to bring more severe charges or offering to reduce the pending charges.61  
And the prosecution must keep the promises made to induce that guilty plea.62  The 
regime has come to have much in common with private contract law.63 Defendants have 
trial rights they can negotiate away. Prosecutors have the bargaining leverage created by 
the available evidence and the (increasingly broad) array of charging possibilities 
established by the legislature, with super-strong norms of prosecutorial discretion leaving 
their choices among punitive options unregulated by courts. And notwithstanding cogent 
critiques of rules that tolerate the effective imposition of a penalty on those defendants 
with the temerity to stand trial, a robust system of negotiated dispositions has flourished 
in every jurisdiction. 
 
 Even the most pragmatic effort to justify this model of defendant “autonomy” 
would require some guarantee that defendants – particularly the 80% or so who could not 
afford counsel and were provided with lawyers by the state64 -- receive adequate legal 
representation. But the literature reporting systemic inadequacies on this score has been 
piling up for decades.65 Even so, and in the absence of widespread political commitment 
to ensuring defender adequacy, the Supreme Court’s contribution has been limited.  In 
1984, in Strickland v. Washington,66 it established what soon became the general 
constitutional framework for assessing whether a convicted defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel has been violated. To prevail, a defendant needs to show not 
only that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 
but that there was “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.”67 Thereafter, in 1985, the Court 
gingerly applied this two-prong analysis to one aspect of the plea process, and held that a 
defendant who had pled guilty on the advice of counsel could get his conviction 
overturned for “ineffective assistance of counsel” if he could show that counsel’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (voluntariness standard); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357 (1978); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule 
of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (criticizing 
Bordenkircher).  
62 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
63 See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
64 See Caroline Wolf Harlow, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases (2000) 
(approximately 66% of felony Federal defendants and 82% of felony defendants in large State courts 
represented by public defenders or assigned counsel). 
65 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006); 
66 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
67 Id. at 688, 694. 
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performance was objectively unreasonable and that there was “a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.”68 
 
 From time to time in the succeeding decades, the Court gave somewhat more 
content to the Strickland framework, generally in the context of death penalty cases.69  
But defense successes were scarce, mostly because courts – particularly outside of the 
capital cases, where the “result” that might have been different was the death sentence, 
not just the guilt determination -- found it easy to find that, even with better lawyering, 
defendants would still have been convicted.70 
 
 Two stable aspects of Strickland doctrine precluded a host of criminal defendants 
from even articulating ineffective assistance claims: the assumption that only legal advice 
about the criminal case itself, not “collateral consequences” of conviction, was of 
constitutional interest, and the assumption that a defendant who “enjoyed” his 
constitutional right to trial and was adequately represented at trial had nothing to 
complain about. Between 2010 and 2012, the Court relaxed, indeed dismantled, both 
assumptions in decisions that strained to balance a new recognition of criminal justice 
realities with a strong and explicit desire – of the sort not seen in Blakley and Crawford – 
to limit the impact of its work. 
 
 In 2010, in Padilla v. Kentucky,71 the Court held that a defense attorney who fails 
to advise a noncitizen client that a guilty plea will nearly certainly lead to deportation has 
failed to meet the constitutional standard of objective reasonableness. Because of 
deportation’s  “close connection to the criminal process” made it “uniquely difficult to 
classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence,” Justice Stevens (writing for the 
Court) found the “collateral versus direct distinction” “ill-suited to evaluating 
a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of deportation,” and held that “advice 
regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.”72  Justice Alito (joined by Chief Justice Roberts) 
concurred, but would have limiting the holding to cases where defense counsel gave 
legally incorrect advice.73 And Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented, 
finding “no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required advice 
regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at 
hand—to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction 
after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction.”74 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
69 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
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70 See Steven Zeidman, Padilla v. Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformational Impact, 39 Fordham 
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 Padilla’s effect should not be overstated.  One scholar hailed it as “the Court's 
first case to treat plea bargaining as a subject worthy of constitutional regulation in its 
own right and on its own terms.”75 Others have been less effusive, noting that the 
decision does not change bargaining dynamics that make deportation unavoidable and 
that its impact may be reduced to a new line on a harried defender’s check list.76 Save for 
a decision refusing to apply Padilla retroactively -- because it had so clearly “broke new 
ground” and announced a “new rule”77 -- the Court has stopped developing this line of 
doctrine, leaving lower courts to mostly (but not entirely) hold the line on efforts by 
defendants to apply the case to other consequences – like the obligation to register as a 
sex offender.78 Should Padilla be seen as an incremental move in a larger project to 
regulate what really matters in plea bargaining market place?  It is far too soon to tell, but 
the important point, for our purposes, is that – in contrast to Crawford and 
Apprendi/Blakely -- further regulation is not a necessary implication of the decision. 
Moreover, the Court’s regulatory focus on defense advocacy, rather than judicial advice 
or prosecutorial power highlights its restraint.  
 
 Perhaps a more consequential regulatory move – although one still focused on 
defense counsel performance -- came in a pair of 2012 cases, Lafler v. Cooper79 and 
Missouri v. Frye.80 These started, albeit very gingerly, to address the plight of the largest 
group of defendants overlooked by Strickland: those who never intended to go to trial but 
who would have received far better deals had their lawyers been any good. These 
decisions explicitly acknowledged “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”81 The alleged inadequacy of the lawyer in 
Frye was straightforward: he had failed to tell his client about a plea offer from the 
prosecution that, thereafter, had expired, leaving him to face, and plead to, a more severe 
charge. The twist in Lafler was that the defendant ill-served in plea negotiations – here 
the lawyer had told the client about the favorable plea offer but incompetently advised 
him not to take it – had been convicted (with a higher sentence) after “a full and fair” jury 
trial.82 
 
 Writing for the Court in both cases, Justice Kennedy moved in to “define the duty 
and responsibility of defense counsel in the plea bargain process,”83 or, as Justice Scalia 
scornfully put it, “open up a whole new boutique of constitutional jurisprudence (‘plea-
bargaining law’).”84 In Frye, with little issue about the deficiency of counsel’s 
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performance, the Court remanded to the state court for an inquiry into whether (1) the 
defendant would have accepted the lapsed plea; (2) the prosecution would have adhered 
to the agreement, and (3) the trial court would have “permitted the plea bargain to 
become final.”85 In Lafler, because defense counsel’s inadequacy had been conceded and 
defendant had shown that “he and the trial court would have accepted the guilty plea” 
carrying a lighter sentence, the Court reasoned that the “correct remedy” was “to order 
the State to reoffer the plea agreement. Presuming respondent accepts the offer, the state 
trial court can then exercise its discretion in determining whether to vacate the 
convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, to vacate only 
some of the convictions and resentence respondent accordingly, or to leave the 
convictions and sentence from trial undisturbed.”86 
 
 Quite the clash: what appears to be a bold extension of constitutional regulation 
into the plea bargaining process, coupled with an acknowledgement of prosecutorial 
control over charging concessions, and a remedy that appears to license an extraordinary 
degree of trial judge discretion.87 There is little reason to believe that many defendants 
will get the benefit of the slender doctrinal path to relief offered by Lafler and Frye.88   
The defendant radically disadvantaged by his lawyer’s failure to pursue a cooperation 
overture from the government is still almost certainly without recourse.89 Do these cases 
presage more substantial and sustained regulatory activity? Justice Scalia said they 
would, and noted that “it would be foolish to think that ‘constitutional’ rules governing 
counsel's behavior will not be followed by rules governing the prosecution's behavior in 
the plea-bargaining process that the Court today announces ‘is the criminal justice 
system.’”90  But dire predictions by dissenters should be discounted. Others have more 
calmly, and sanguinely, predicted that these cases will spark extrajudicial efforts to make 
the extension and nature of plea bargains more regular and law-like.91 
  
 Time will tell. Perhaps the world of Bordenkircher v. Hayes – the one that leaves 
prosecutors free to use inflated sentencing threats (which they often had a hand in 
legislating) to buy back ostensibly expansive constitutional rights from criminal 
defendants, and that tolerates the effective imposition of a penalty on defendants who 
chose to stand trial – may start to crumble. It certainly will be more transparent if 
prosecutors, to protect against later ineffective assistance claims, uniformly put plea 
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(proposing that judges use their remedial powers to define appropriate uses of prosecutorial discretion). 
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offers and expiration dates on the record. And lower court judges have started to push 
hard at doctrines that tie their hands when the government responds to a defendant’s 
decision to stand trial by adding new mandatory minimum charges.92 But so far the 
minimalist constitutional approach to guilty pleas that often seems to have more in 
common with a private law than a public law regime remains in place. And there is good 
reason to expect that the Court’s slender and episodic interventions will be exceptions to 
the norm of a deconstitutionalized marketplace – a few clear lines on a largely unadorned 
canvas. 
 
IV.   Framing and Collaboration 
 
 While the breadth, depth, and scope of the Court’s Crawford and 
Apprendi/Blakely projects distinguish them from the relatively narrow interventions in 
Padilla and Frye/Lafler, all were constitutionally unilateral: doctrinal operations 
performed on, but not (except perhaps for the Lafler remedy) responsive to jurisdictional 
law and institutional choices. Whether looking to originalism or some more pragmatic 
sense of justice, the Court simply drew on its own constitutional resources for norm 
articulation. 
 
 But unilateral intervention is not the Court’s only mode and may not even be its 
preferred mode, for real or potential constitutional norms are regularly articulated by 
other institutional actors – lower federal courts, state courts, Congress, and state 
legislatures. Indeed, the real “neo-constitutionalism” (to the extent one can identify it) 
may end up being a lot more collaborative than top down projects like those considered 
so far may suggest.   
 
 One gets a sense of the Court’s attention to this external norm development even 
when the Court decides not to intervene. Consider Perry v. New Hampshire,93 where the 
defendant claimed that Due Process Clause offered him protection against an eyewitness 
identification that had made under unduly suggestive circumstances but that had not been 
orchestrated by the police.  By 2012, when this case arose, the pitfalls of eyewitness 
identifications and the risks that juries were ill-equipped to assess the reliability of such 
witnesses had been well-documented, and had also been dramatized by a number of DNA 
exonerations.94 These reliability concerns were not restricted to cases in which the police 
had orchestrated the witness’s contact with the suspect, but longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent made constitutional inquiry turn on just that factor. The Perry Court, however, 
refused to reconfigure its doctrine to require some “preliminary judicial assessment” of 
reliability in the absence of “improper law enforcement activity.” Writing for the Court, 
Justice Ginsburg noted that “many state and federal courts” were already giving juries 
cautionary instructions about eyewitness testimony generally and that “[i]n appropriate 
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cases, some States also permit defendants to present expert testimony on the hazards of 
eyewitness identification evidence.”95 
 
 Notwithstanding the laissez faire result of the opinion, Justice Ginsburg was 
writing against a backdrop of not just experimentation with jury instructions and expert 
testimony but of elaborate intervention by some state courts, acting under their own state 
constitutions.96  Indeed, in 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court – after empowering a 
special master to conduct extensive hearings on the weaknesses of eyewitness 
identification evidence -- had just mandated a new pretrial inquiry and jury instruction 
regime that some believe should be a model for the nation.97 State protocols are not self-
enforcing, and progress may be slow, but Perry may end up being just a refusal to lead, 
not a rejection of a growing regulatory wave. 
 
 The Court’s constitutional approach to DNA collection from arrested suspects 
provides another example to its reliance on, and perhaps even collaboration with, other 
regulatory authorities – here both from state governments and the federal political 
branches. It also show the extent to which the Court has been content to take a back seat 
to lower courts on a core crime and security issue.   
 
 Soon after DNA testing gained recognition as a powerful forensic tool for 
investigating and prosecuting crimes (of the sort that involve biological trace material), 
federal authorities established a nationwide scheme for DNA collection, storage, and 
analysis.  At its heart was the DNA Identification Act of 1994’s creation of the FBI’s 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), a central repository into which federal agencies 
and all states can “upload” DNA profiles and in which they can search among the profiles 
deposited by other jurisdictions. This national database includes “offender profiles” 
(obtained from known persons) and samples of unknown origin gathered from crimes 
scenes.98 Because sample collection and profile loading efforts initially focused on 
convicted offenders -- who have vastly reduced Fourth Amendment protection against 
searches and seizures – lower courts found them to pass constitutional muster and the 
Supreme Court never took a case.99 
  
 In 2013, the Court found reason to intervene, when Maryland asked it to overturn 
a state court decision striking down the state’s expansion of its collection program to 
those arrested for a crime of violence or burglary. The Court’s opinion (by Justice 
Kennedy) in Maryland v. King100 -- which held that “DNA identification of arrestees is a 
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reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure”101 -- has 
two notable features. The first is actually the lack of a feature, as Kennedy’s easy 
balancing of the state interest in “identifying” an arrested suspect against the suspect’s 
privacy interest stands in stark contrast with Justice Scalia’s insistence (joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan), on warrants as the touchstone for Fourth Amendment 
analysis.  (Consider this an unsuccessful attempt at the sort of formalist intervention that 
has prevailed in cases like Crawford and Blakely).102 
 
 The second feature is the Court’s easy confidence that the information thus 
obtained from suspects would not be misused. Some of this confidence may an artifice of 
doctrinal limitations, for Fourth Amendment doctrine has always been willfully blind to 
use regulation.  If police can properly see and take something, Fourth Amendment has 
been read to say virtually nothing about how the state uses it down the road. As Erin 
Murphy has noted: “Even the dissent largely ignore[d] the data retention aspect of the 
case in favor of focusing on collection.”103 Yet Justice Kennedy did take pains to explain: 
 
It is undisputed that law enforcement officers analyze DNA for the sole purpose 
of generating a unique identifying number against which future samples may be 
matched. . . . If in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an 
arrestee's predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not 
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy concerns not 
present here.104 
 
While I make no claim about the adequacy of state regulation and the CODIS architecture 
to protect civil liberties as a normative matter, they certainly made a big difference to the 
Court in King. And the case stands as nice example of the collaborative constitutionalism 
that regularly (although not reliably) makes an appearance in the Court’s recent work. 
 
 To see the Court deciding, in real time, which sort of constitutional approach to 
take on a critical set of crime and security issues, one has only to watch the Court 
working through recent digital surveillance cases.105  The issue in United States v. Jones 
(2012)106 was whether the warrantless installation and month-long monitoring of a GPS 
device attached to the defendant’s car violated his Fourth Amendment rights.  The 
Court’s constitutional formula for search cases – which looks to whether someone has a 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area being searched107 -- made this a tough 
case. After all, one who drives on public streets has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
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in where his car goes.108 But perhaps the constitution has something to say about the 
government’s ability to essentially create an encyclopedic dossier on someone’s life.  
And lurking underneath the question presented was the technological reality that most of 
us carry GPSs in our pockets in the form of cell phones. 
 
 To resolve the question presented, Justice Scalia (writing for the majority) relied 
on the same sort of formalist originalism that did heroic (and ultimately inadequate) work 
in other cases.  Forget about “expectations of privacy,” Scalia explained; the analytical 
focus should be on the actual attachment of the GPS device. Here 
 
[t]he Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when it was adopted.109 
 
A nice clear rule that Scalia admitted had nothing to say about situations where 
monitoring could be done “without an accompanying trespass.” But it did avoid hard 
questions about privacy on the open road. 
  
 Joined by three others, Justice Alito scorned the disconnect between Scalia’s 
analytical framework and the regulatory challenge (a disconnect regular feature of 
Scalia’s criminal procedure work). “The Court’s reasoning,” Alito noted, largely 
disregards what is really important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term 
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to something that most would view as 
relatively minor (attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that does not 
interfere in any way with the car’s operation).” In the wake of new devices – including 
cell phones --- that permit precise tracking, the “best solution to privacy concerns” would 
likely be legislative. But since “Congress and most States have not enacted statutes 
regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for law enforcement purposes,” “[t]he best 
that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth Amendment doctrine and to ask 
whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of intrusion that a 
reasonable person would not have anticipated.” And under the circumstances here – four 
weeks of monitoring in context of an investigation that did not involve “extraordinary 
offense,” the line had been crossed and the Fourth Amendment violated.110 
 
 In a separate concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, while agreeing with Justice Alito 
that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
impinges on expectations of privacy,’” mused on scenarios the Court will eventually have 
to face, particularly with respect to tracking information “voluntarily” provided by cell 
phone users to cellular providers. Drawing on what some have called a “mosaic theory” 
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(because it looks to the potential for data points to be assembled into a detailed and 
complete picture), Justice Sotomayor suggested that, even in the short term, “someone 
might have a “reasonable societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s public 
movements.” She “would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements 
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”111 She 
went on to call into question what has been a foundational, albeit much criticized, Fourth 
Amendment precept – the “third party doctrine,” which presumes that the person who 
voluntarily conveys information to a third-party lacks a protectable privacy interest in 
it.112 
 
 In the hands of different Justices in Jones, one sees all of the Court’s 
constitutional brushes at work.  Scalia’s strong formalist lines make for a nice miniature 
that resolves the case but without engaging the larger regulatory problem. Alito 
provisionally deploys the Court’s standard privacy framework, with the ad hoc nature of 
the resulting analysis reinforcing his plea for legislative intervention and offering a 
different variant of regulatory restraint. Sotomayor would cut loose and start constructing 
a larger constitutional edifice that would be far more protective of privacy interests than 
the present one in the face of new technologies. Not surprisingly, those concerned about 
the National Security Agency’s collection of metadata (and at least one district judge 
addressing that program113) have drawn heavily on her opinion. 
 
For now, however, the Court proceeds gingerly. In Riley v. California114 -- even 
as it refused to extend standard “search incident to arrest” doctrine to permit the police so 
search data accessible via a suspect’s cell phone without a warrant -- the Court addressed 
the government’s concerns about the loss of evidence and noted that exigent 
circumstances might support a warrantless search in particular cases. At the same time, 
Chief Justice Roberts laid down a marker for future doctrinal development by 
acknowledging that the kind of data people store (or have access to through the “cloud”) 
on their cell phones is “qualitatively different” from the sort of information found in 
pockets and wallets. 
 
 We can expect additional brush strokes soon. Lower courts are figuring out 
whether warrantless use of GPS devices to track cars is permissible when officers have 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause (an argument the government was deemed to have 
forfeited in Jones, having failed to raise it below),115 or whether the police can freely 
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draw on past cellular tower data to track someone’s past movements.116 Meanwhile, a 
few states have moved to require warrants for cellphone location tracking,117 and 
Congress is contemplating action. The contours of the emerging regulatory regime are 
hard to predict.  But it safe to say that the Court’ views on constitutional doctrine will not 
be the only contributor (and probably not even the most important contributor) to the new 
norms.118 
 
V.  Conclusion  
 
 Does some metatheory explain the Court’s brush strokes or must we rely on some 
unsatisfying (albeit correct) observations about shifting alliances on a multi-member 
court? I’m just not sure. In the crime and domestic security area, the Court’s 
constitutional ambitions sometimes sound limited (consider the plea bargaining cases).  
Other times, they sound quite sweeping but deploy grand rhetoric and ostensibly broad 
doctrine to very small effect. Nor can one safely generalize the extent to which the Court 
will self-consciously acknowledge criminal justice dynamics and institutions outside its 
walls – the ones that, whether acknowledged or not, will limit or shape the effects of its 
doctrinal pronouncements on actual cases.  
 
Still, I do see a connection between the proscriptive clarity of the Court’s 
constitutional work and the doctrinal domains it addresses.  This is a Court ready to say a 
lot – in elaborate detail – about issues that can be safely cabined. Beyond those, its forays 
are extraordinarily restrained, episodic, even impressionistic. This is a Court content to 
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